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Our Nation from the inception has sought to preserve and expand the 
promise of liberty and equality on which it was founded.  Today we enjoy 
a society that is remarkable in its openness and opportunity.  Yet our 
tradition is to go beyond present achievements, however significant, and 
to recognize and confront the flaws and injustices that remain.  This is 
especially true when we seek assurance that opportunity is not denied on 
account of race.  The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the 
reality is that too often it does.1 – Justice Kennedy. 
 
                                                          
∗
 Associate, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP.  J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School 
of Law, 2009; B.M., Berklee College of Music, 2005.  I would like to thank Professors 
Kathryn Abrams and Angela P. Harris and the students of their Social Justice Writing 
Seminar, who gave me so many helpful comments and worked with me on various drafts of 
this article.  I would also like to thank Professors Edward Steinman, Diane Marie Amann, and 
John Yoo and the Honorable William A. Fletcher, who shaped the way I look at constitutional 
law.  This article is dedicated to the loving memory of my parents.  The views expressed in 
this article are those of the author alone. 
 
1
 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For many years, affirmative action has been one of the most controversial civil 
rights issues.2  It has polarized society into two camps: one side arguing that 
affirmative action is necessary to remedy both the past injustices of de jure 
segregation and the current injustices of de facto segregation;3 and the other side 
arguing that affirmative action is nothing more than present discrimination against 
those who are not responsible for the injustices of the past.4  For many years, the 
Supreme Court has struggled with the concept of affirmative action.5  Like its effect 
in broader society, affirmative action has sharply divided the Court’s members into 
those same two camps.6 
Over the years, the controlling members of the Court, the swing voters who have 
dealt with the affirmative action issue—Justice Powell, Justice O’Connor, and now 
                                                          
 
2
 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Comment: Sins of 
Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986); see also 
John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 
(1974); Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action 
Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986). 
 
3
 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 823-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (advocating for the use 
of a standard that is less than strict scrutiny based on the context of the case, in particular, that 
it was an integration program that sought to remedy de facto segregation); Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court once again maintains that 
the same standard of review controls judicial inspection of all official race classification.  This 
insistence on ‘consistency’ would be fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank 
discrimination long reinforced by law.  But we are not far distant from an overtly 
discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully 
evident in our communities and schools.” (citations omitted)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 
448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Because the consideration of race is relevant to 
remedying the continuing effects of past racial discrimination, and because governmental 
programs employing racial classification for remedial purposes can be crafted to avoid 
stigmatization, . . . such programs should not be subjected to conventional ‘strict scrutiny.’”); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Government may take race into account when it acts not to 
demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past 
racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or 
administrative bodies with competence to act in this area.”); see also Kennedy, supra note 2, 
at 1327-34; Sullivan, supra note 2, at 78-79. 
 
4
 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Roberts, C.J., plurality) (“The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“‘Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[G]overnment can never have a ‘compelling 
interest’ in discriminating on the basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial 
discrimination in the opposite direction.”); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 525 (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(“Under our Constitution, the government may never act to the detriment of a person solely 
because of that person’s race.”); see also Kennedy, supra note 2, at 1327-34; Sullivan, supra 
note 2, at 78-79. 
 
5
 See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 78. 
 
6
 See supra notes 3-4. 
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Justice Kennedy—have been stuck in the middle between these two camps, 
attempting to bridge the two sides of the Court and create a compromise with respect 
to affirmative action.7  The normative vision of affirmative action adopted by these 
controlling members is that affirmative action is a sometimes necessary but 
dangerous tool.8  They believe that because of its necessity, there should not be an 
outright ban on all forms of affirmative action, but because of its danger, the 
Supreme Court should carefully examine and evaluate each affirmative action 
program.9 
The controlling members enforced this compromise through the Supreme Court’s 
strict scrutiny test, which requires that a challenged government action be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.10  Originally used as a test to 
quickly strike down invidiously discriminatory laws, the swing voters changed strict 
scrutiny into a detailed “means-ends” factual inquiry when faced with the problem of 
affirmative action, examining whether the government’s actions met two 
constitutional requirements.11  The first requirement is the “compelling interest” 
requirement, which examines the challenged government action’s “ends.”12  The 
Supreme Court has required that a government affirmative action program’s “ends” 
must be either to remedy past discrimination or to achieve diversity.13  While the 
Supreme Court has been fairly clear about what governmental “ends” constitute a 
compelling interest, the Court has been much more opaque when describing the 
second requirement—the narrow tailoring requirement—which examines the 
challenged government action’s “means.”14  This narrow tailoring requirement and 
the Supreme Court’s difficulty in defining its scope will be the focus of this Article. 
The narrow tailoring requirement, as initially developed by Justice Powell 
through a series of cases, set out some loose factors for the Supreme Court to use in 
its evaluation of government affirmative action programs.15  The Powell Court 
seemed to take a somewhat contextual approach to the narrow tailoring requirement 
in which the Court looked at the particular circumstances of each individual 
affirmative action program and based its determination on the set of factors that 
seemed pertinent to that particular situation, as opposed to relying on categorical 
                                                          
 
7
 See infra Parts II, III. 
 
8
 See infra Part IV. 
 
9
 Id. 
 
10
 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 
11
 See infra Part II. 
 
12
 Id. 
 
13
 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325-30 (2003) (stating that past cases have 
found that remedying past discrimination is one compelling government interest and holding 
that student body diversity is another compelling state interest); see also Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(stating that it is permissible for school boards “to consider the racial makeup of schools and 
to adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial 
composition”). 
 
14
 See infra Part II. 
 
15
 See infra Parts II.A, II.B. 
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requirements.16  In later cases under Justice O’Connor, the Court’s narrow tailoring 
requirement became a highly formalistic inquiry that determined the constitutionality 
of government affirmative action programs by looking at whether the government 
program met certain categorical requirements.17  In particular, Justice O’Connor 
focused on whether the affirmative action programs attempted to grant benefits or 
burdens to individuals by employing set-asides—which gave race a numerical 
quantification—or whether the programs made individualized determinations where 
race was one factor of many and not given a numerical quantification.18  Justice 
O’Connor disapproved of the former and approved of the latter.19  In addition to that 
requirement, she also required that government affirmative action programs adopt 
race-neutral alternatives, if available, and possess a sunset provision—a specified 
termination date for the program created at its outset.20 
Unfortunately, Justice O’Connor’s rigid and categorical inquiry did a poor job of 
reflecting the controlling Justices’ affirmative action compromise and properly 
policing affirmative action programs because it could be either too harsh or too 
lenient on affirmative action programs depending on the factual scenario.21  It could 
be too harsh because sometimes Justice O’Connor’s requirements could be so 
demanding that they created an absolute bar to some forms of affirmative action.22  
Conversely, it could also be too lenient because sometimes the rigid factors allowed 
some affirmative action programs containing invidious discrimination to slip by.23  
This discrepancy demonstrates that Justice O’Connor’s approach to narrow tailoring 
failed to strike the proper balance between outright banning affirmative action and 
fully accepting affirmative action.  Thus, it did not reflect the compromise between 
the two camps of the Court that the controlling members—including herself—
advocated for. 
In his first and only affirmative action decision since becoming the controlling 
member of the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, showed a possible willingness to go back to 
the looser, more contextualist view of the narrow tailoring requirement that the Court 
embraced when Justice Powell was the swing vote.24  This Article argues that 
regardless of whether Justice Kennedy actually was moving back toward a more 
contextualist approach to narrow tailoring, a shift away from the highly formalistic 
inquiry adopted by Justice O’Connor back to the looser contextual standard used by 
Justice Powell has the potential to fix the previously mentioned problem of failing to 
                                                          
 
16
 Id. 
 
17
 See infra Part II.C. 
 
18
 Id. 
 
19
 Id. 
 
20
 Id. 
 
21
 See infra Part IV. 
 
22
 Id. 
 
23
 Id. 
 
24
 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Comment: 
Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2007). 
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achieve a proper compromise between the two sides of the Court.25  In addition, this 
Article also suggests how the Court could improve upon Justice Powell’s approach 
to narrow tailoring by enumerating a nonexclusive set of flexible factors that the 
Supreme Court could use in evaluating individual affirmative action programs and 
suggesting how the factors could be applied.26 
Part II of this Article details and comments on the history of the narrow tailoring 
requirement as developed by Justices Powell and O’Connor.  Part III examines the 
Parents Involved decision, particularly focusing on Justice Kennedy’s controlling 
concurrence opinion and focusing on Professor Heather Gerken’s claim that 
Kennedy’s apparent shift from his concurrence in Grutter v. Bollinger27 can possibly 
be explained as his adopting a more contextualist approach to narrow tailoring.  Part 
IV analyzes and criticizes Justice O’Connor’s formalistic approach by demonstrating 
that it was both too harsh and too lenient on affirmative action, and that the reason 
for this discrepancy is that affirmative action programs cannot be properly evaluated 
by rigid rules that are applied broadly to all such programs.  Part IV also lays out a 
solution to the problems created by Justice O’Connor’s rigid categorical 
requirements by describing why, regardless of whether Justice Kennedy actually was 
adopting a contextualist approach in Parents Involved, the Supreme Court should 
move back to the contextualist approach the Court used when Justice Powell was the 
controlling member.  Finally, Part V explains how the Supreme Court could build 
upon Justice Powell’s contextualist approach by suggesting several loose factors that 
the Supreme Court could apply in its analysis and how those factors might be 
applied. 
II.  A HISTORY OF THE NARROW TAILORING REQUIREMENT UNDER THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The words “strict scrutiny” and “narrowly tailored” do not appear anywhere in 
the Constitution. 28  The use of the words came about through a judicially crafted test 
that the Supreme Court developed over time.29  Although the Supreme Court in cases 
like Korematsu v. United States30 and Bolling v. Sharpe31 used language that 
anticipates modern formulations of the strict scrutiny test, the birth of the modern 
strict scrutiny test as used in racial discrimination cases came in McLaughlin v. 
                                                          
 
25
 See infra Part IV. 
 
26
 See infra Part V. 
 
27
 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 
28
 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2007). 
For a thorough analysis of the history of the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test, see id. 
 
29
 Id. 
 
30
 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid 
scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; 
racial antagonism never can.”). 
 
31
 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“Classifications based solely upon race 
must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence 
constitutionally suspect.”). 
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Florida.32  McLaughlin dealt with a Florida statute that forbade the habitual 
occupation of a room at night by “[a]ny negro man and white woman, or any white 
man and negro woman, who [were] not married to each other.”33  In McLaughlin, the 
Court stated that all racial classifications are “constitutionally suspect” and should be 
subjected “to the most rigid scrutiny.”34  In addition, the Court stated that a law 
containing racial classifications, “even though enacted pursuant to a valid state 
interest, bears a heavy burden of justification, . . . and will be upheld only if it is 
necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible 
state policy.”35  Three years later, in Loving v. Virginia, a case dealing with the 
constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws, the Court again used similar language 
to describe the strict scrutiny test:   
[T]he Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be 
subjected to the “most rigid scrutiny,” and, if they are ever to be upheld, 
they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some 
permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which 
it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.36   
The language used in these two cases clearly required reviewing courts to conduct a 
factual inquiry examining whether the challenged government action’s “ends” are 
legitimate or permissible—whether there is a permissible state policy or objective—
and then determine if the “means” chosen by the government are necessary for the 
achievement of those “ends”—in other words, necessary to achieve that policy or 
objective. 
Although these early strict scrutiny cases asked the Court to engage in a factual 
review of the challenged government program and determine whether the “ends” 
justified the “means,” some claimed that the Supreme Court appeared to engage in 
no such factual review and quickly struck down laws as soon as it was determined 
that they should be reviewed by strict scrutiny.37  Thus, it was assumed that the 
invocation of strict scrutiny as the standard of review meant that the challenged 
government action would be declared unconstitutional no matter what facts were 
present in a particular case.38  This led Professor Gerald Gunther to famously call the 
strict scrutiny test “‘strict in theory’, but fatal in fact.”39 
                                                          
 
32
 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); see Fallon, supra note 28, at 1277. 
 
33
 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 184. 
 
34
 Id. at 192. 
 
35
 Id. at 196. 
 
36
 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (citation omitted). 
 
37
 See generally Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
 
38
 Id. at 8; Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive 
Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (“[M]ost 
have concluded that a judicial determination to apply ‘strict scrutiny’ is little more than a way 
to describe the conclusion that a particular governmental action is invalid.”). 
 
39
 Gunther, supra note 37, at 8. 
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However, a closer examination reveals that Professor Gunther’s claim that strict 
scrutiny was an absolute bar to any government action was exaggerated.  The Court 
in these cases did engage in a factual inquiry of each challenged law, but each 
time,the Court found that the only justification for the challenged law was 
impermissible invidious discrimination, which the Court has held can never be a 
permissible or legitimate justification for a racial classification under strict 
scrutiny.40  Thus, the Court never had to go past the first prong of the strict scrutiny 
test, which examined the government’s purported “ends”—what eventually became 
the compelling interest prong—because the government’s “ends” were always 
deemed illegitimate.  It was not until the Supreme Court began to review race-based 
classifications related to affirmative action programs that the Court found racial 
classifications that it considered benign and not based on invidious discrimination.41  
Once confronted with benign classifications, the Court found satisfactory 
governmental “ends”—compelling state interests—and, thereby, was finally forced 
to engage in a deeper factual inquiry into the challenged government programs to 
determine whether the chosen “means” were appropriate.42  Interestingly, this might 
have been why the Court stopped using the word “necessary” to describe the second 
prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it did in McLaughlin and Loving, and eventually 
moved to the words, “narrowly tailored.”  The word “necessary” seems to demand a 
much closer fit between the “ends” and the “means” than the words “narrowly 
tailored.”  Thus, adoption of the new language might have been a way of the Court 
saying that the second step of the strict scrutiny test was going to be more lenient 
and more factually driven. 
The Supreme Court actually did not begin using the exact words “narrowly 
tailored” during the application of the strict scrutiny test until the early 1970s, and 
when it did so, it was in cases involving the First Amendment, not the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.43  It was not until 1980, 
in Fullilove v. Klutznick, that the Supreme Court used the phrase “narrowly tailored” 
                                                          
 
40
 See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose 
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.  The fact that 
Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the 
racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain 
White Supremacy.”). 
 
41
 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978). 
 
42
 Professor Fallon has offered an alternative explanation for the Court’s apparent 
differences in its strict scrutiny analysis between affirmative action cases and all other equal 
protection cases.  He states that, over time, the Supreme Court has actually adopted three 
different strict scrutiny standards, and the Court has applied different ones at different times.  
See Fallon, supra note 28, at 1302-15. 
 
43
 See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); Police Dept. of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972).  That the Supreme Court borrowed the term 
“narrowly tailored” from its First Amendment cases for its Equal Protection cases is not 
surprising.  In McLaughlin v. Florida, the Court’s first big step in articulating a standard for 
the strict scrutiny test, Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion stated that the “necessity test”—
what he called the strict scrutiny test at that time—had been first developed in First 
Amendment free speech cases and is “equally applicable in a case involving . . . racial 
discrimination.”  McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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in an equal protection case to describe the second prong of the strict scrutiny test.44  
However, by the 1978 case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the 
Court’s first decision on affirmative action, the Court had already begun using a very 
similar phrase, “precisely tailored,” to describe the second prong of the strict 
scrutiny test.45 
A.  Bakke: The Court’s First Look at Affirmative Action 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the University of California at Davis Medical School’s admission policy 
of setting aside a specified number of seats for minority students.46  The university’s 
admission policy required that the school operate a dual system application process 
where eighty-four of the one-hundred slots where open to everyone, and the 
remaining sixteen slots were available only to minority students.47  Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Stewart, Stevens, and Rehnquist all held that the admission 
policy was invalid but did not consider the constitutional question of whether the 
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because they found that it violated Title 
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.48  Justice Powell provided the fifth vote needed to 
invalidate the policy, but argued that the policy was unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause because it failed to pass strict scrutiny.49  Justices Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun dissented and argued for the application of intermediate 
scrutiny and found that the policy passed the lower standard.50 
Although Justice Powell was only writing for himself, his view of the strict 
scrutiny standard as applied to affirmative action programs would help guide the 
Supreme Court in all of its future affirmative action decisions.  First, in stating why 
the policy should be subjected to strict scrutiny and not intermediate scrutiny, Justice 
Powell focused on the language contained in the Fourteenth Amendment itself, 
which he interpreted as extending the clause to all “persons.”51  Therefore, the Equal 
Protection Clause could not mean one thing when applied to one person, but another 
thing when applied to someone else of a different race, meaning that all racial 
classifications should be subjected to the same level of scrutiny—strict—regardless 
of what race was receiving the benefits or burdens of the government’s program.52 
Justice Powell then turned to the first part of the strict scrutiny analysis and held 
that either rectifying past discrimination or achieving a diverse student body could 
                                                          
 
44
 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) (“We recognize the need for careful 
judicial evaluation to assure that any congressional program that employs racial or ethnic 
criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present effects of past discrimination is 
narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.” (emphasis added)). 
 
45
 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978). 
 
46
 Id. at 270-72. 
 
47
 See id. at 272-76. 
 
48
 Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 
49
 Id. at 315-21 (plurality opinion). 
 
50
 Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). 
 
51
 Id. at 293-94 (plurality opinion). 
 
52
 Id. 
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satisfy the compelling interest requirement of the strict scrutiny test.53  However, 
Justice Powell found that there was no evidence of past discrimination by the 
university, so the university did not have a compelling interest in remedying past 
discrimination.54  Therefore, the university’s only possible compelling interest was in 
achieving diversity, and Justice Powell found that the medical school’s policy was 
not the only effective means of serving that interest.55  He disapproved of the 
university’s use of a rigid quota because it made race the sole deciding factor in 
determining whether some individuals obtained admission to the medical school.56  
Instead, he stated that a proper model could be the one used by Harvard College 
where there is no numerical quota set for minorities and race is just used as a “plus” 
factor among many other factors in the admissions process to help increase a 
university’s diversity.57  Powell emphasized that a program like this treats each 
applicant as an individual and prevents an applicant’s race from being the sole 
deciding factor in determining his or her admission to the university.58 
B.  Fullilove, Wygant, and Paradise: Justice Powell’s Interpretation of the Narrow 
Tailoring Requirement 
After Bakke, the Supreme Court—with Justice Powell as the controlling 
member—decided the constitutionality of three more affirmative action programs in 
Fullilove v. Klutznick,59 Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,60 and United States 
v. Paradise.61  In these decisions, the Court expanded Bakke’s reasoning from the 
domain of education to employment and public contracting affirmative action 
programs.  In each case, as in Bakke, the Court was faced with a government 
affirmative action program that employed a quota or set-aside, meaning that these 
programs gave race a numerical quantification.  First, in Fullilove, the Supreme 
Court evaluated a federal law that required that any public works project seeking a 
federal grant to set-aside 10% of the grant for Minority Business Enterprises 
(MBEs).62  Next, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
evaluated a school system’s preferential protection against layoffs of minority 
workers where, in the event that it became necessary, the Jackson Board of 
                                                          
 
53
 Id. at 307, 312. 
 
54
 Id. at 309-10. 
 
55
 Id. at 315-19.  As noted in the previous section, at the time of Bakke, the Supreme Court 
had not begun to use the language “narrowly tailored” to refer to the “means” analysis prong 
of the strict scrutiny test.  Instead, in Bakke, Justice Powell used the language “precisely 
tailored.”  Despite the difference in language, the Bakke decision remained highly influential 
in guiding the Supreme Court in its future narrow tailoring analyses.  See, e.g., Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  
 
56
 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20. 
 
57
 Id. at 316-18. 
 
58
 Id. at 317-18. 
 
59
 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 
60
 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 
61
 United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
 
62
 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448. 
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Education agreed that it would only layoff as many minority teachers as it would lay 
off non-minority teachers—a one-to-one quota.63  Adherence to this rule caused the 
Board to lay off tenured non-minority teachers rather than non-tenured minority 
teachers.64  Finally, in Paradise, the Court reviewed a federal district court order 
requiring the Alabama Department of Public Safety to create a set-aside in which it 
would hire one black trooper for each white trooper hired—another one-to-one 
quota.65  This program would continue until black troopers constituted approximately 
25% of the state trooper force, in order to remedy past intentional employment 
discrimination by the Department of Public Safety.66  Despite the fact that all four 
cases, including Bakke, involved government affirmative action programs that 
utilized numerical set-asides, the Court split over the four programs, finding two, the 
ones in Bakke and Wygant, unconstitutional,67 and two, the ones in Fullilove and 
Paradise, constitutional.68 
This split shows that the Supreme Court with Justice Powell as the swing vote 
took a contextualized rather than categorical approach to the narrow tailoring 
requirement.  Although the Court never announced clear, consistent principles for 
the narrow tailoring requirement in these cases, it was clear that the Court was 
moving in a direction in which it would evaluate affirmative action programs on an 
individualized basis to determine whether the program was narrowly tailored.  In 
finding the Fullilove program constitutional, the Court focused on these specific 
facts: the program was enacted through the legislative authority of Congress, who 
possesses broad remedial powers; the program was being challenged on its face 
rather than through a specific implementation; and the program contained a waiver 
and exemption provision stating that the set-aside could be waived if the contractor 
could demonstrate that there were not sufficient qualified minority business 
enterprises in the relevant market.69  In finding the Wygant program unconstitutional, 
Justice Powell focused particularly on the fact that this employment case dealt with 
layoffs rather than hiring.70  Justice Powell stated that “[d]enial of a future 
employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job”71 because 
while a hiring goal merely imposes “a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of 
several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality 
on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.”72  Thus, 
he rejected layoffs as an appropriate means in employment affirmative action cases.  
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In finding the Paradise program constitutional, the Court focused on the egregious 
facts of the case, where the Alabama Department of Public Safety not only had a 
proven long history of discrimination in its employment practice but was also 
resistant to all of the district court’s attempts to remedy this discrimination.73  In 
addition, the Court focused on these facts: the requirement could be waived if no 
qualified black candidates were available; the district court’s goal of attaining a 
department comprised of 25% black troopers reflected the relevant work force; the 
program was temporary and extremely limited in nature; and, finally, that a district 
court’s determination of what relief is appropriate should be given deference.74  The 
Court’s appreciation of the different facts presented in each case shows that it was 
adopting a more contextualist approach. 
In addition to outcomes of these cases, the Court’s language also shows that it 
was adopting a contextualist approach.  In Paradise, both Justice Brennan and 
Justice Powell stated that the narrow tailoring analysis requires the Court to look at 
several factors.75  Justice Powell stated:  
In determining whether an affirmative-action remedy is narrowly drawn 
to achieve its goal, I have thought that five factors may be relevant: (i) the 
efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; 
(iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be 
employed and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant 
population or work force; (iv) the availability of waiver provisions if the 
hiring plan could not be met; and (v) the effect of the remedy upon 
innocent third parties.76 
Although this is a list of categorical factors, the italicized language shows that 
Justice Powell was advocating for a contextualist approach.  Powell used the word 
“may,” and thus thought that these were factors that a reviewing court might use in 
evaluating the constitutionality of a government affirmative action program 
depending on the facts before it, rather than absolute requirements that the court 
must find in each program.  Unfortunately, a majority of the Court failed to adopt 
these factors because, in Paradise, Justice Stevens only concurred in judgment with 
Justices Brennan and Powell, leaving their multi-factored tests adopted by only a 
plurality of the Court.77  That the Court with Justice Powell as its controlling member 
was utilizing a contexualist approach to the narrow tailoring requirement is key in 
understanding where the requirement was at when Powell handed the controlling 
position over to Justice O’Connor and where she then took the requirement. 
C.  Croson, Gratz, and Grutter: Justice O’Connor’s Interpretation of the Narrow 
Tailoring Requirement 
In 1987, Justice Powell retired from the Supreme Court, and Justice O’Connor 
eventually assumed the position of controlling member—the swing voter—of the 
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Court with respect to its affirmative action decisions.  Justice O’Connor took her 
first step in assuming this position by writing the Court’s first post-Justice Powell 
affirmative action opinion, Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.78  In Croson, the Supreme 
Court declared unconstitutional a city affirmative action program similar to the 
federal law that the Court declared constitutional in Fullilove.79  The city of 
Richmond, Virginia, enacted a plan that awarded city contracts requiring the 
contractor to subcontract at least 30% of the total dollar amount of each contract to 
Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs).80  Like the set-aside in Fullilove, the 
Richmond plan defined MBEs as businesses owned by minority group members who 
are “[c]itizens of the United States [and] who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, 
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts.”81 
As an initial matter, the Croson decision was very important as it was the first 
decision in which a majority of the Court agreed that an affirmative action program 
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, although a majority failed to agree on what 
that standard entailed.82  In each of the four previous cases, the Court had fought 
over whether government affirmative action programs should be reviewed under 
strict or intermediate scrutiny.83  Thus, this was first time that the Court firmly held 
that government affirmative action programs must meet strict scrutiny’s narrow 
tailoring requirement, although the holding was limited to state affirmative action 
programs and not federal programs. 
Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor began her analysis by stating that the 
plan was not linked to any identified past discrimination by the city of Richmond, 
but only a generalized assertion that discrimination had occurred in the past in that 
particular industry.84  She also pointed out that there was absolutely no evidence at 
all showing that any past discrimination had occurred against any Spanish-speaking, 
Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut person, and, therefore, the “random inclusion” of 
these races along with blacks as part of the set-aside scheme was improper.85  Thus, 
the Richmond plan failed the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test 
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because the government did not have a compelling interest in remedying general 
societal discrimination.86  Even though the plan failed the compelling interest prong, 
Justice O’Connor still made a few observations about whether the plan was narrowly 
tailored.  She stated that “there [did] not appear to [be] any consideration of the use 
of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation in city 
contracting.”87  Furthermore, Justice O’Connor criticized the use of the 30% set-
aside, which reflected the number of minorities in the city’s total population rather 
than the minority population in the relevant work force.88  Justice O’Conner also did 
not see why the rigid numerical quota was necessary because bids and waivers were 
already determined on a case-by-case basis, allowing the affirmative action decisions 
to be made on an individual basis.89  In conclusion, Justice O’Connor stated that she 
thought that the city’s only interest in establishing a quota, despite already having an 
individualized procedure, was simple administrative convenience, which is not a 
compelling interest and is not enough to justify the use of racial classifications.90 
Although Justice O’Connor did not expressly say she was doing so, it does 
appear that she was relying on Justice Powell’s factors in evaluating the 
constitutionality of the Richmond plan.  Her criticism of the program’s 30% set-
aside not being linked to the relevant job market was directly linked to Powell’s third 
factor of looking at the relationship of the set-aside with the relevant market.  Also, 
her advocacy for race-neutral alternatives is similar to Powell’s first factor of 
looking at the efficacy of alternative remedies, although it is much more specific 
than Powell’s factor.  Instead of using the general term “alternative remedies,” 
Justice O’Connor made it clear that these alternatives should be race-neutral.  
However, it was unclear in her opinion whether efficacy would remain a 
consideration, or if any available race-neutral means—effective or not—should be 
adopted.  Justice O’Connor’s preference for individualized determinations rather 
than set-asides seems to be linked to Justice Powell’s fifth factor, the program’s 
effect on the harm of third parties, because she felt that individualized 
determinations “are less problematic . . . because they treat all candidates 
individually, rather than making the color of an applicant’s skin the sole relevant 
consideration.”91  Thus, Justice O’Connor appeared to be adopting Powell’s fifth 
factor, but she made it more specific by preferring individualized determinations 
rather than set-asides.  This preference will be elaborated on shortly. 
Justice O’Connor’s analysis shows that while she did consider factors similar to 
those Justice Powell relied on in Paradise, she sought to give these factors more 
specificity by explaining exactly what they should entail in each program.  Thus, 
Justice O’Connor sought to use categorical factors that were narrower and more rigid 
than those that Justice Powell had advocated for—in particular, her preferences for 
race-neutral alternatives and for individualized determinations rather than set-asides.  
However, she only referred to her categorical factors as “observations” and did not 
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use words like “may” or “should” in describing how to apply the factors.92  Thus, she 
left unclear whether these categorical factors would be applied loosely as Justice 
Powell’s language in Paradise suggested, or if the Court would apply them rigidly, 
as absolute requirements rather than factors. 
Although the “narrow tailoring” requirement in Croson was far from a clear test, 
the Court did not take another case that involved a narrow tailoring determination of 
an employment, educational, or public works affirmative action program for almost 
fifteen years.93  In the meantime, the Court issued two opinions that determined the 
appropriate level of review for federal government affirmative action programs, 
specifically programs approved by Congress.  In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Brennan held that congressionally 
approved affirmative action programs should be reviewed under the intermediate 
scrutiny standard,94 but Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Rehnquist 
dissented and argued that reviewing courts should use strict as opposed to 
intermediate scrutiny.95  Over the next couple years, the makeup of the Court 
changed significantly with four new Justices—Thomas, Souter, Ginsberg and 
Breyer—joining the Court.  The most important of these changes was the 
replacement of the highly liberal Justice Marshall with the highly conservative 
Justice Thomas, who later joined the four dissenting Justices from Metro 
Broadcasting to overrule it.  In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held 
that “all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”96  
This meant that “[f]ederal racial classifications [including all forms of affirmative 
action], like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and 
must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”97 
Although Adarand only involved a determination of the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to be applied to the federal government program, Justice O’Connor, writing 
for the Court, stated that she wanted to “dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict 
in theory, but fatal in fact.’”98  “When race-based action is necessary to further a 
compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 
‘narrow tailoring’ test this Court has set out in previous cases.”99  This language 
sought to dispel the notion that the high “narrow tailoring” bar set forth by the Court 
in Croson was impossible to meet and instructed lower courts that they should 
engage in a meaningful review when determining if government affirmative action 
programs meet the narrow tailoring requirement.  The fact that Justice O’Connor felt 
it necessary to add this language in the Adarand case reflects the likelihood that most 
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courts and lawyers interpreted her observations in Croson with respect to the narrow 
tailoring requirement to be rigid requirements rather than loose factors.100 
During this period, the Supreme Court also decided a series of cases involving a 
very specific type of affirmative action: racial gerrymandering, which is the drawing 
of voter district lines predominantly based on race.101  In the first case, Shaw v. Reno, 
the Court merely held that racial gerrymandering is subject to strict scrutiny.102  In 
the second case, Miller v. Johnson, the Court failed to reach the narrow tailoring 
prong of the strict scrutiny test because the court settled the case based on the 
compelling interest prong.103  In the final two cases, Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera, 
the Supreme Court finally reached the narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny 
test.104  However, these two decisions did little to provide insight on the application 
of narrow tailoring in other contexts because, in both cases, the Court quickly 
dismissed the claim that the racial gerrymandering at issue was necessary to remedy 
past discrimination and instead focused on whether the redistricting was narrowly 
tailored to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.105  
For example, in Shaw v. Hunt, the Supreme Court’s narrow tailoring analysis 
began by stating that the legislative action must, at a minimum, remedy the 
anticipated violation of, or achieve compliance with, Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act to be narrowly tailored.106  Also, “a plaintiff must show that the minority group 
is ‘geographically compact’ to establish [Section] 2 liability.”107  The Court next held 
that the legislation was not narrowly tailored because “[n]o one looking at District 12 
could reasonably suggest that the district contains a ‘geographically compact’ 
population of any race.  Therefore where that district sits, ‘there neither has been a 
wrong nor can be a remedy.’”108  The Court also rejected the State’s argument that 
once a Section 2 violation exists anywhere in the state, the state can draw majority-
minority districts anywhere.109 
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Although the voting rights cases do little to clarify the opaqueness of the Croson 
opinion, they are very important in this discussion because they represent an area 
where the Supreme Court, with Justice O’Connor as the swing vote, was willing to 
take a more contextualist approach to narrow tailoring.  Instead of attempting to 
make factual inquiries that relied on categorical requirements that all forms of 
affirmative action should meet, the Court focused solely on the issue of racial 
gerrymandering and what facts would justify the use of race in that particular 
context—the narrow inquiry of whether the program was necessary in order to 
comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Although the Court never 
expressly explained its rationale for adopting a different approach to narrow tailoring 
in these cases, it seems fairly clear that it adopted this different standard because the 
Court was faced with a different compelling interest, compliance with Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act,110 rather than the two compelling interests that are typically 
claimed and accepted by the Court in all other affirmative action cases, namely 
remedying past discrimination and achieving diversity.  Thus, it seems here that 
Justice O’Connor was willing to expand the narrow tailoring evaluation beyond the 
factors identified in Croson because she was willing to expand the compelling 
interest requirement beyond the compelling interests that were mentioned in Croson. 
Fourteen years after Croson, the Supreme Court decided a pair of cases involving 
the University of Michigan’s admission programs.  These cases greatly clarified the 
narrow tailoring requirement because both cases reached the narrow tailoring inquiry 
with one program being declared constitutional and the other program being declared 
unconstitutional.  In the first case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court reviewed 
the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admission program and held that it was 
unconstitutional because it failed to meet the Court’s “narrow tailoring” 
requirement.111  The University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program 
operated by using a fixed point system that assigned each applicant a point-value for 
each factor that the university deemed relevant to an admissions decision.112  A total 
score of 100 points means that admission was guaranteed.113  As one of the factors, 
the university labeled African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans 
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“underrepresented minorities,” and automatically awarded each member of these 
groups twenty points on the basis of race.114  In comparison, a perfect SAT score was 
only awarded twelve points.115 
Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court stated that the program was not 
narrowly tailored and was thus unconstitutional.116  In doing so, the Chief Justice 
compared the point system to the set-aside in Bakke and stated that, as in Bakke, race 
could become the sole decisive factor in an admission decision.117  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stated that although the system allowed some applicants to be flagged for 
individual review, that flagging was the exception rather than the rule, so that race 
remained decisive in virtually all cases.118  Furthermore, the twenty-point addition 
was fixed and automatic rather than individualized.119  He also rejected the college’s 
argument that the volume of applications made individual review impractical 
because administrative difficulties could not salvage an otherwise unconstitutional 
system.120  Rehnquist’s firmness against claims of administrative difficulties is 
reminiscent of the language used by Justice O’Connor in Croson.121  This firmness in 
both cases shows that the Court was being very strict about its race-neutral 
requirement and that it required the government to take less-intrusive, race-neutral 
means if they were available at all, even if they were not possible or practical. 
In the second case, Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
University of Michigan’s law school admission program and held that it was 
constitutional and satisfied the Court’s narrow tailoring requirement.122  The 
University of Michigan Law School’s admission policy required individual review 
of an applicant’s file where race was a factor for consideration, but it was not 
assigned a quantitative value.123  Although the law school did not target a particular 
number or quota of underrepresented minority students, the admission department 
did seek to ensure that a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority students would 
be admitted to the law school.124 
In an opinion by Justice O’Connor, the Court adopted Justice Powell’s reasoning 
in Bakke and upheld the law school’s admissions policy.125  Interestingly, before 
beginning her strict scrutiny analysis, Justice O’Connor stated that “[c]ontext matters 
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when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”126  It appears that Justice O’Connor made this statement to emphasize that 
the Court was dealing with diversity in the context of higher education and that in 
this context, the Supreme Court should show deference to a university’s academic 
decisions.127  This language certainly shows openness to Justice Powell’s contextual 
approach to narrow tailoring.  However, as seen by her strict scrutiny analysis in the 
case, she continued to rely on rigid categorical requirements rather than loose factors 
in making her narrow tailoring determination. 
Justice O’Connor began her strict scrutiny analysis by stating that the admission 
policy conformed to the ideal admissions program endorsed by Justice Powell in 
which race is used as a “plus” factor.128  She stated that a discretionary, 
individualized system would be “flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
elements.”129  Furthermore, Justice O’Connor stated that race-neutral means such as 
“‘using a lottery system’ or ‘decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on 
undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores’”130 were not necessary, as they “would 
require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted 
students, or both.”131  This was a strange flexibility Justice O’Connor embraced 
compared to the rigidness of requiring less intrusive means in Gratz and Croson.132  
In this decision, Justice O’Connor seemed to think that race-neutral means were only 
necessary if they were as effective as the challenged government program.  Finally, 
in order to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement, Justice O’Connor added her own 
sunset provision for the program and held, in a rather arbitrary manner, that “25 
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further 
the interest approved today.”133  For later purposes, it should be noted that in this 
case, Justice Kennedy dissented and claimed that the program was not narrowly 
tailored because it sought to achieve racial balancing.134 
These two cases clarified Justice O’Connor’s problem with set-asides.  Her 
careful scrutiny of set-asides seemed to be based on fear of race-based harm to an 
individual person, which would violate the “person” language contained in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  This is the same concern that Powell wrote about in Bakke 
and listed as one of his narrow tailoring factors in Paradise.135  The distinction 
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between affirmative action programs that utilize individual review and those that 
employ set-asides is based on whether an individual can point to the exclusion from 
himself to a specific benefit and the inclusion of another individual to that same 
benefit with the sole reason for that inclusion or exclusion being the race of the 
individuals.136  For example, under the undergraduate admission program in Gratz, 
any non-underrepresented minority who had a point total of 80-99 and was denied 
admission could state that race was the sole reason for her failure to gain admission 
because had she received the twenty-point bonus for race, she would have been 
automatically admitted into the university.  However, non-underrepresented minority 
applicants with competitive scores denied admission to the law school program in 
Grutter could not make this claim.  Since race was not given a numerical value in the 
Grutter program, an applicant was unable to point to race as being the sole decisive 
factor for being denied admission.  This encourages government agencies that would 
like to adopt affirmative action programs to engage in a type of “don’t tell, don’t 
ask” policy of granting benefits based on race without clarifying or quantifying them 
in advance, much like the Harvard program in Bakke.137 
After Grutter and Gratz, Justice O’Connor’s vision of the narrow tailoring 
requirement seemed clearer.  She appeared to endorse a formalistic approach that 
relied on three rigid requirements for all affirmative action programs: (1) they should 
rely on individual determinations rather than set-asides that include or exclude an 
individual solely on the basis of their race; (2) they should adopt race-neutral means 
if available; and (3) although emphasized less in her opinions, they should possess a 
sunset provision. 
III.  PARENTS INVOLVED: JUSTICE KENNEDY’S INITIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
NARROW TAILORING REQUIREMENT 
In its most recent affirmative action decision, Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Supreme Court again displayed the 
polarizing nature of affirmative action cases.138  Reminiscent of Bakke, there were 
four justices striking down the program and arguing for colorblind constitutional 
principles, four justices dissenting and arguing for the need for affirmative action 
programs due to the problems of discrimination, and one justice, Justice Kennedy, 
left in the middle to find a compromise.139 
The Seattle School District and the Louisville School District sought to achieve 
racial diversity in their public school systems.140  The school districts aimed to 
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accomplish this end by instituting racial tie-breakers for admission to the school.141  
In Seattle, where the schools were 41% white and 59% nonwhite, any school that 
was not within 10% of these two numbers would be deemed “integration positive,” 
and the District would apply the tie-breaker to admit the student whose race would 
serve to bring the school into balance.142  In Louisville, there was a similar program, 
but there the tie-breaker worked so that each school maintained a minimum black 
enrollment of 15% and a maximum black enrollment of 50%.143  The Supreme 
Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that these racial tie-breakers were unconstitutional.144 
In a plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts—joined by Justices Alito, Scalia 
and Thomas—the plurality advocated for a colorblind approach to the Equal 
Protection Clause.145  Roberts stated a simple solution to the problem of racial 
discrimination: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”146  Justice Breyer—joined by Justices Souter, 
Stevens, and Ginsberg—wrote a dissent and advocated for a standard that appeared 
to be a looser form of strict scrutiny and found that the integration programs were 
constitutional.147 
The most important opinion in Parents Involved was written by Justice Kennedy 
concurring in judgment, who, like Justice Powell in Bakke, wrote only for himself. 
Kennedy rejected both the plurality’s colorblind approach and the dissenters’ looser-
than-strict-scrutiny standard.148  Justice Kennedy concurred in judgment because he 
found that the integration programs were unconstitutional and did not satisfy the 
“narrow tailoring” requirement because the racial tie-breakers placed more reliance 
on race than the admission policy that was found to be unconstitutional in Gratz.149  
In this aspect of the opinion, Justice Kennedy still seemed to be aligned with Justice 
O’Connor’s rigid view of the narrow tailoring requirement that all set-asides are 
unconstitutional because they create too much harm on innocent third parties.  
Although Justice Kennedy found the program to be unconstitutional, what separated 
his opinion from the colorblind camp and Justice O’Connor and surprised 
constitutional scholars was his sweeping language supporting race-conscious 
remedies.  Justice Kennedy stated:  
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of 
diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic 
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources 
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for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; 
and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.150 
Rather than state that diversity is merely a permissible constitutional end, Justice 
Kennedy stated that the government’s goal should be “to go beyond present 
achievements, however significant, and to recognize and confront the flaws and 
injustices that remain.”151  
While Justice Kennedy’s language in his opinion is commendable, it is somewhat 
contradictory.  In his criticism of the numerical quantification of race, Justice 
Kennedy seemed to be aligning himself with Justice O’Connor’s rigid view that 
individualized determinations using race as one of many factors are required by the 
narrow tailoring requirement.  However, his description of race-conscious means 
that would be appropriate in lower education affirmative action programs indicates 
that he was adopting a looser standard in which government affirmative action could 
expressly rely on race in their decision making as long as it was in these certain 
specific instances.  Because of this contradiction, it remains to be seen where Justice 
Kennedy actually wants to take the narrow tailoring requirement now that he is the 
controlling member of the Court. 
After the Parents Involved decision was released, many commentators accused 
Justice Kennedy of softening his stance on affirmative action.152  They pointed to his 
previous concurring and dissenting opinions in cases like Grutter and Croson where 
he appeared to be in line with the colorblindness camp that Justice Scalia, Justice 
Thomas, now Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Alito advocated for and claimed that 
the pressures of being the swing vote caused Justice Kennedy to now align with the 
views of Justices Powell and O’Connor.153  They claimed that being the controlling 
member of the Court requires adoption of the “don’t tell, don’t ask” affirmative 
action policy, which condemns set-asides, tolerates individualized determinations, 
and was used by those two previous controlling members.154 
However, Professor Heather Gerken has offered a different explanation for this 
apparent shift.  She stated that the apparent shift in Justice Kennedy’s views on 
affirmative action is not a shift at all: it merely demonstrates that he prefers a 
contextualist approach to the Equal Protection Clause.155  Rather than create a 
general “narrow tailoring” requirement that should be applied to all forms of 
affirmative action, Justice Kennedy is applying a different requirement for lower 
education than he would for higher education.156  The difference in his approach 
between Grutter and Parents Involved just shows that he views the compelling 
interest of achieving diversity to be more appropriate in lower education, where 
children are still developing and need to learn how to work with others, than in 
graduate school, where students are already young adults and have already 
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developed their social skills.157  For Justice Kennedy, this shows that where the 
affirmation action program is being applied is just as important as what the program 
mandates during the narrow tailoring inquiry. 
Professor Gerken’s interpretation of the Parents Involved decision certainly 
displays that Justice Kennedy is open to the contextualist approach that the Court 
took when Justice Powell was the controlling member, though Gerken admits that 
her view is not the only way to read Parents Involved.158  However, because Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion lacks much of the language that would support Gerken’s 
assertions,159 it is unclear if Justice Kennedy even knows he is doing this.  
Regardless of whether he is opening himself up to a more contextualist standard, 
consciously or subconsciously, the next section of this Article will display the flaws 
in Justice O’Connor’s approach and explain why a contextualist approach is more 
desirable.  Justice Kennedy should therefore continue in the direction of taking a 
contextualist approach to the narrow tailoring requirement and align himself more 
with the views of Justice Powell. 
IV.  THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE CURRENT STATE OF NARROW TAILORING 
This section of the Article argues that Justice O’Connor’s formalistic approach to 
the narrow tailoring requirement is flawed because, as applied, it can be both too 
lenient and too harsh on affirmative action.  This difficulty arises from the fact that a 
rigid, rule-based test cannot best serve the Court’s controlling members’ normative 
assumptions about affirmative action.  As in the broader society, this issue has 
heavily polarized the Court into two groups, and both Bakke and Parents Involved 
reflect this.  One camp of justices argues for a colorblind Constitution and claims 
that racial classifications, no matter how well-intentioned, are unconstitutional.160  
The other camp sees affirmative action as a necessity to right the wrongs of the past 
and to create a truly integrated society, and it claims that the benign intentions justify 
a lenient inquiry that gives wide discretion to lawmakers to implement affirmative 
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action programs.161  These two different beliefs about affirmative action reflect the 
differing views about affirmative action in broader society.162  However, the Court as 
a whole, except perhaps briefly in the case of Metro Broadcasting when it adopted 
the intermediate scrutiny test with respect to congressionally enacted affirmative 
action, has never fully accepted either principle.163  Instead, the controlling members 
of the Court have kept the Constitution’s view on affirmative action somewhere in 
the middle, compromising between the two views. 
In determining the Supreme Court’s normative vision of affirmative action, it is 
important to look not just at the tests used by the controlling members of the Court, 
but also at the language they used in these decisions.  In Bakke, Justice Powell 
recognized that “[t]he State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in 
ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified 
discrimination.”164  And, in Wygant, he stated that “[a]s part of this Nation’s 
dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon 
to bear some of the burden of the remedy.”165  Thus, it seems that Justice Powell 
recognized that affirmative action might be necessary to truly remedy the effects of 
past discrimination.  However, Justice Powell also stated, in Bakke, that “[r]acial and 
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most 
exacting judicial examination.”166  He explained that courts should thoroughly 
examine affirmative action programs because they force innocent members of the 
public “to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making,” and they 
might “only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to 
achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship 
to individual worth.”167  Therefore, it appears that Justice Powell’s view of 
affirmative action was that it might be necessary to fully remedy discrimination, but 
that it is a dangerous option and should be carefully monitored. 
Justice O’Connor appeared to have a view similar to Justice Powell’s.  While 
Justice O’Connor did not use language as strong as Justice Powell in talking about 
the need for affirmative action, she did think that affirmative action should be 
allowed in certain circumstances and that is why, in Adarand, she stated that strict 
scrutiny is not “‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”168  “Although all governmental 
uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it.”169  Thus, while 
not as supportive of affirmative action as Justice Powell, Justice O’Connor did seem 
to believe that affirmative action was important and necessary enough in certain 
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circumstances that there should not be an outright ban.170  This is why she never 
aligned herself with the colorblind advocates on the Court.  However, like Justice 
Powell, Justice O’Connor was concerned about the dangers of affirmative action 
programs and stated that courts should carefully evaluate any such program: “Absent 
searching judicial inquiry into the justification for . . . race-based measures, there is 
simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and 
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority 
or simple racial politics.”171  She explained that the need for this searching inquiry 
existed because racial classifications carry a danger of stigmatic harm because they 
might “promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial 
hostility.”172 
Despite having only one opinion as the controlling member of the Supreme 
Court, Justice Kennedy’s language quickly aligns with Justice Powell’s and Justice 
O’Connor’s views on affirmative action.  Justice Kennedy, in Parents Involved, 
stated that it is our nation’s tradition to go past present achievements “to preserve 
and expand the promise of liberty and equality on which it was founded.”173  This is 
why Justice Kennedy refused to accept the claim that the Constitution is colorblind 
and that schools are required to ignore the problem of de facto segregation in 
schooling.174  Justice Kennedy, like the other two prior swing justices, appears to be 
aware that the discrimination of the past is still a present day problem and that one of 
the ways to effectively remedy the problem is through affirmative action.  That is 
why affirmative action should not be completely prohibited.  But just like Justices 
Powell and O’Connor, Justice Kennedy warned of the dangers of affirmative action: 
When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first define 
what it means to be of a race.  Who exactly is white and who is nonwhite?  
To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent 
with the dignity of individuals in our society.  And it is a label that an 
individual is powerless to change.  Governmental classifications that 
command people to march in different directions based on racial 
typologies can cause a new divisiveness.  The practice can lead to 
corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element of our diverse 
heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political process.175 
Based on these dangers, Justice Kennedy, like the two previous controlling Justices, 
demanded that courts engage in a thorough examination of any affirmative action 
program.176 
Although possibly to varying degrees, Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Kennedy 
seemed to share similar normative views on affirmative action.177  They realized that 
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discrimination and segregation were not just problems of the past and that 
affirmative action might be an appropriate and necessary solution to those problems.  
Therefore, the Constitution should not require a complete ban on affirmative action.  
However, they also recognized that affirmative action is a dangerous tool that has the 
potential to create more problems than it solves.  Therefore, affirmative action 
programs must be carefully monitored and only allowed if their implementation is 
proper and necessary because some affirmative action can actually harm minorities.  
This normative view of affirmative action presented by these three justices clearly 
represents a compromise between the colorblind camp on the Court and the pro-
affirmative action camp on the Court.  This compromise between competing values 
is also probably what caused these controlling justices to rely heavily on the narrow 
tailoring requirement because it allowed them some maneuverability around the 
tough constitutional questions presented by affirmative action.178 
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With this goal of achieving a proper compromise between the two camps in 
mind, the question then becomes which approach to narrow tailoring best serves this 
normative vision.  As the rest of the section below will explain, Justice O’Connor’s 
approach to narrow tailoring serves the vision poorly because it can be at times too 
harsh on affirmative action and at other times too lenient on affirmative action.  
Thus, rather than using the narrow tailoring requirement to achieve a proper 
compromise between the two different sides of the Court, Justice O’Connor’s 
approach waivers between the two sides, sometimes aligning her test with the 
colorblind camp and sometimes aligning her test with the pro-affirmative action 
camp. 
The individual harm factor is a clear example of a narrow tailoring factor that can 
be both too lenient and too harsh on affirmative action.  The Supreme Court in 
Grutter and Gratz made clear that race can be used as a factor in admission decisions 
as long as applicants are reviewed on an individual basis with race being one of 
many factors considered and race is not given a numerical value.179  The rationale 
behind creating this rule is that giving race a numerical value would amount to a set-
aside, and the creation of a set-aside violates the Equal Protection Clause because, at 
some point, a black applicant would be accepted solely on the basis of race and a 
white applicant would be denied acceptance solely on the basis of race.180  Thus, race 
would become the decisive factor, and this would be a clear violation of the language 
of the Equal Protection Clause, which the Court has repeatedly held protects 
individual people, not groups.181 
This individual determination factor can create harsh results to affirmative action 
programs because for some government actors, it acts as an absolute bar to 
affirmative action programs.  For example, many public universities like the 
undergraduate program at the University of Michigan have so many applicants every 
year that it is impractical for them to make individual determinations for each and 
every applicant.182  However, the Court in Gratz clearly stated that administrative 
burdens are not an excuse for the use of constitutionally impermissible set-asides.183  
Because it is impractical for these universities to adopt an individualized review 
admissions program and unconstitutional for them to adopt a numerical system to 
take account of race, they are then forced to forgo their affirmative action programs 
and, thus, ban affirmative action from their admission decisions. 
However, individual determinations of race can also be too lenient on affirmative 
action because in a program like the one in Grutter, where race is one of many 
factors, but is not given a numerical quantification, it is impossible to know how 
much weight race is being given.  Without numbers to match the criteria, there is no 
possibility for judicial review that could examine how the government actor weighed 
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the factors.  Because it is impossible to police a “don’t tell, don’t ask” policy, there is 
nothing to stop someone from relying entirely on race in making these decisions and 
brushing aside all other diversity factors.184  Further, the rationale behind making 
such a decision cannot be scrutinized.  For example, an admissions officer might 
choose to grant a preference to a Mexican, believing Mexicans are generally liberal, 
rather than a Cuban, believing Cubans are generally conservative, even though both 
are underrepresented minorities.  A reviewing court, however, would have no ability 
to scrutinize this blatant invidious discrimination.185 
What this leniency and harshness on affirmative action shows is that Justice 
O’Connor’s approach does a poor job of balancing her policies.  When the 
requirement for individual determinations is applied to situations in which it creates 
an absolute bar to any affirmative action program, then Justice O’Connor’s narrow 
tailoring requirement moves from being a middle-of-the-road policy and aligns itself 
with the colorblind camp.  On the other hand, because the requirement for individual 
determinations does not allow courts to scrutinize determinations that rest on 
invidious stereotypes, Justice O’Connor’s narrow tailoring requirement moves away 
from being a middle-of-the-road policy and aligns itself with the camp that believes 
in giving government actors broad discretion to use racial classifications.  This 
shows that, depending on the factual context of the affirmative action program, 
Justice O’Connor’s narrow tailoring requirement fulfills the policy of one of the two 
camps.  Therefore, her affirmative action test ends up actually being an “either or” 
policy rather than a middle-of-the-road policy.  This demonstrates that when 
evaluating affirmative action programs, context should and does matter, and that a 
broad rigid rule applied to all factual scenarios is ineffective at striking the balance 
between the controlling members’ competing policies because it results in the Court 
flip-flopping between two extremes.  It should also be noted that the flaws in the 
individual determination factor are very striking because in many of the Court’s 
affirmative action decisions, this requirement was clearly the most important one and 
often decisive.186  One would think that such an important factor would do a better 
job of enforcing Justice O’Connor’s underlying policies. 
Another important factor employed by Justice O’Connor is the requirement for 
race-neutral alternatives.  This requirement, at first, seems sensible.  Because 
affirmative action policies have the potential to harm third parties, these policies 
should not be allowed if there is an alternative solution that is just as effective at 
solving the problem without risking harm to third parties.  However, this factor may 
not serve her policy goals depending on the factual situation.  The requirement for 
race-neutral alternatives can act as an absolute bar to affirmative action programs 
even in situations where the race-neutral alternatives were completely ineffective.  
For example, in Walker v. City of Mesquite, the Fifth Circuit held that a judge could 
not require race-conscious remedies to desegregate the city of Dallas when race-
neutral remedies were available.187  However, the Court did not engage in any 
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evaluation of the effectiveness of these race-neutral remedies, and the race-neutral 
remedies in this case were so ineffective that they created no practical remedy to the 
de facto segregation problem at all.188  Thus, the absolute requirement for race-
neutral alternatives in this case allowed the Fifth Circuit to align itself fully with the 
colorblind camp and reject the affirmative action program even if it was necessary to 
remedy past harms.  A requirement for race-neutral alternatives only when they are 
as effective as the affirmative action program or when they have at least 
demonstrated some efficacy would do a much better job of serving Justice 
O’Connor’s policies. 
The only requirement that actually seems to accurately serve the Court’s policy is 
the requirement for affirmative action programs to possess a sunset provision.  
Requiring that every affirmative action program have a definite end point rejects 
colorblindness in that it allows government actors to adopt affirmative action 
programs.  But, by requiring that the programs last only for a limited duration, this 
provision ensures that the programs are carefully scrutinized because it requires that 
government actors monitor and reevaluate their program in light of changing 
circumstances before reenacting it.  After all, the goals of these programs should be 
to provide a remedy for past discrimination or to achieve diversity.  Thus if the 
program has worked and achieved its goal of remedying past discrimination or 
achieving diversity, there is little reason for its continued existence.   
However, this requirement, like the others, is nevertheless subject to abuse 
because Justice O’Connor has never been clear about how this factor is to be applied 
and evaluated by courts.  Indeed, in Grutter, Justice O’Connor very loosely applied 
the factor at the end of the opinion and based the program’s required length 
arbitrarily on the number of years since the Court decided Bakke.189  If the length of 
the program is made too short, then it could prove to be too burdensome on 
legislatures, who would constantly have to spend time to reevaluate the program.  
This burden could cause legislatures to then forgo enacting any affirmative action 
legislation.  Thus, the factor in this situation would align the Court with the 
colorblind camp.  However, if the length of the program is too long, then it will not 
serve its purpose of requiring government actors to closely monitor their programs 
and adapt them to changing circumstances.  Much can change in twenty-five years—
the number adopted by the Court in Grutter—for better, for worse, or not at all; thus, 
it seems that a length this long would do a fine job of adapting the program to 
changing circumstances.  Justice O’Connor’s policies would greatly benefit from 
clarifying this standard. 
The problems with these three factors also display a fundamental problem with 
using rules as opposed to standards.190  Rules are rigid inquiries that require a judge 
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to apply the facts to the different elements of a judicial test almost like solving a 
mathematical formula.191  On the other hand, standards give much more discretion to 
the judge to take in all the facts and weigh them against each other in order to make 
his determination.192  A clear example of the distinction between rules and standards 
can be seen by looking at two different tort cases the Supreme Court decided in the 
early 1900s.193  Both cases dealt with the standard of conduct that should govern the 
obligations of a driver who comes to an unguarded railroad crossing.194  In the first 
case, Justice Holmes suggested that the requirements of due care at railroad 
crossings are clear and, therefore, adopted a rule: the driver must stop and look 
back.195  In the second case, Justice Cardozo did not think it was so clear and gave 
examples of when it was neither wise nor prudent for a driver to stop and look at a 
railroad crossing.196  Therefore, he adopted a standard: “[t]he driver must act with 
reasonable caution.”197 
The most important distinction between these two forms of adjudication is that 
rule-based law is proper when the underlying values served by the law are 
completely clear.  Standards-based law is proper when the underlying values served 
by the law are obscured, contested, or ambivalently held.  The previous example 
displays this distinction.  Justice Holmes thought that the standard of care for a 
driver was clear, and that all a driver would have to do to not be negligent was to 
stop and look.198  Justice Cardozo did not think that the standard of care was clear 
and described many instances where it would not make sense to stop and look.199  
Thus, for these judges it is clear that when determining whether to adopt a rule or a 
standard, the primary issue was whether the underlying value served by the law—the 
proper standard of care—was clear. 
This difference between rules and standards illuminates the problem with the 
Justice O’Connor’s affirmative action jurisprudence.  Justice O’Connor was 
attempting to apply rigid rules to affirmative action when the underlying values were 
not clear and were potentially in conflict.  As previously stated, both her and Justices 
Powell and Kennedy attempted to balance the need for affirmative action programs 
to rectify the injustices of the past discrimination against the possible harm to third 
parties and the possible resentment it could create toward minorities.  For these 
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Justices, affirmative action was permissible sometimes and impermissible other 
times, depending on the circumstances.200 
Adopting a rules-based approach might actually have seemed sensible to Justice 
O’Connor at first because equal protection law had historically taken a rule-based 
approach.201  However, she was mistaken in doing so because affirmative action 
presents a problem very different from much of the previous equal protection cases.  
Previous equal protection jurisprudence could be rule-based because after Brown v. 
Board of Education,202 the underlying policies were clear: government laws and 
programs should not be based on racial stereotypes nor based on a desire to 
subjugate one class of people to the benefit of another class.203  Therefore, the rigid 
old “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” rule, which struck down all the laws that the 
Court faced, was appropriate to enforce this policy because it was completely clear 
that any law based on invidious discrimination was wrong no matter its context. 
Unfortunately, Justice O’Connor failed to appreciate the difference between her 
policies in dealing with affirmative action and those underlying desegregation.  As 
previously stated, rather than align herself with the colorblind camp or the pro-
affirmative action camp on the Court, Justice O’Connor, like Justices Powell and 
Kennedy, chose to attempt to find a compromise between the two.  However, by 
choosing to find this compromise, Justice O’Connor was faced with unclear 
underlying values that were not amendable to a rule-based approach.  For example, if 
Justice O’Connor had chosen to align herself with the colorblind camp, then the 
adoption of the rule-based approach would have made sense.  That is because for 
Justices like Scalia and Thomas, the underlying value related to affirmative action is 
clear: any use of race by the government is unconstitutional even if for benign 
purposes.204  Therefore, a rule-based approach makes sense for the colorblind camp 
because for those justices the answer of what to do with affirmative action—hold 
that it is all unconstitutional—is as clear as the answer of what to do at a railroad 
crossing was for Justice Holmes—stop and look.  However, when it comes to 
looking at affirmative action, Justice O’Connor’s vision seems to be closer to Justice 
Cardozo’s in that she sees the answer of what to do with it as being uncertain and 
depending on the circumstances.  Justice O’Connor saw the value of affirmative 
action but was concerned about its danger.  Therefore, for Justice O’Connor, some 
affirmative action programs like the one in Grutter might be acceptable while others 
like the one in Croson were not.  This is similar to Justice Cardozo who saw 
stopping to look as being reasonable in some circumstances but unreasonable in 
others.  Therefore, it made little sense for Justice O’Connor in construing the narrow 
tailoring requirement to rely on rigid rules.  A standard-based approach that 
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appreciates the context of each factual situation would have done a much better job 
of allowing Justice O’Connor to properly enforce her underlying values related to 
affirmative action. 
In addition to helping with the problem of unclear values, a standard-based 
approach would also help the Supreme Court deal with the various faces of 
affirmative action.  The problems of de facto segregation are complicated and wide-
ranging.  Therefore, the solutions are also going to be broad and wide-ranging.  A 
standard-based approach would help the Supreme Court be more adaptable to the 
different areas of affirmative action.  The voting rights cases are a perfect example of 
this situation because racial gerrymandering was different than most other forms of 
affirmative action at that time.  Unlike the affirmative action issues in education, 
employment, and public contracting, with racial gerrymandering the government 
action was clearly race-conscious, although not in its specific terms, because it “did 
not appear to single out any identifiable class of persons for special benefits or 
burdens.”205  In the face of this problem, the Court had to break from its previous 
rigid generalized approach for narrow tailoring and develop compelling interest and 
narrow tailoring requirements that were unique to that situation, whether the 
government action was necessary to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act.206 
It is important to note that while this section has shown the many problems 
created by Justice O’Connor’s rigid rule-based approach to defining narrow 
tailoring, the narrow tailoring requirement was not always this way.  When Justice 
Powell was the swing vote, the Supreme Court was much more amenable to taking a 
looser, standard-based approach.207  Justice Powell’s interpretation of the narrow 
tailoring requirement looked at the context of each individual affirmative action 
program and applied loose factors that might be relevant rather than bright line rules 
that must be applied.208  It is quite possible that Justice Powell chose to take a looser, 
standard-based approach to the narrow tailoring requirement precisely because he 
saw that the answer of what to do with affirmative action was not very clear and that 
a standard-based approach would allow him the maneuverability necessary to find a 
proper middle space between the two affirmative action camps on the Court and to 
deal with the many faces of affirmative action.  It is for these reasons that Justice 
Kennedy, regardless of whether he was actually doing so in Parents Involved, should 
adopt in the future the contextual approach to narrow tailoring that was utilized by 
Justice Powell. 
V.  THE CONTEXTUALIST APPROACH TO NARROW TAILORING 
A contextualist approach would solve many of the problems created by Justice 
O’Connor’s interpretation of the narrow tailoring requirement because it would 
create a test where the “narrow tailoring” requirement could be molded to meet the 
different scenarios in which affirmative action is used.  A contextualist approach 
would require a reviewing court to engage in a truly factual inquiry and balance 
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competing factors against each other in order to determine whether each individual 
government affirmative action program is actually “narrowly tailored.”  While 
Justice Powell’s approach was looser and more contextualist than Justice 
O’Connor’s, Justice Powell’s approach can still be improved upon so that it will 
better reconcile the Court’s competing values and solve the need for adaptability to 
the many different faces of affirmative action.  Factors that can be looked at by the 
Supreme Court are: (1) the harm to innocent third parties; (2) whether there is a 
waiver provision; (3) whether the goal of the program is to achieve diversity or to 
remedy discrimination; (4) the duration of the program; (5) the effectiveness of race-
neutral alternatives; (6) which arm of the government enacted the program; (7) what 
type of government program is implementing the action; and (8) whatever other 
factors might be relevant in a particular circumstance.  Below, I will give 
suggestions for how the Supreme Court might balance and apply these factors should 
it adopt a contextualist narrow tailoring requirement. 
The first factor, the harm to innocent parties, should actually encourage 
numerical set-asides rather than condemn them.  It is true that the Fourteenth 
Amendment aims to protect people from government classifications solely on the 
basis of their race, but as shown in the previous section, the individual determination 
requirement does little to police this policy because people are free to make 
decisions solely based on race as long as they do not give it a numerical 
quantification.  Therefore, it is a better approach to encourage affirmative action 
programs to give numerical quantifications to their racial determinations, like the 
Michigan policy did in Gratz, so that it is amenable to exacting judicial review.209  
Once courts know the weight given to race in numerical form, the courts can then 
criticize the weight given to race and, therefore, minimize the harm to individuals.210  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gratz gives a clear example of how this could 
work.  Rather than creating a broad rule stating that any numerical quantification of 
race is unconstitutional, the Court should have criticized the university’s policy of 
weighing underrepresented minority status almost twice as much as a perfect SAT 
score.211  It might seem troubling to some at first that the courts would be given the 
power to determine what constitutes significant racial harm.  However, a look at the 
Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence reveals that Court has done this in the past. 
In Washington v. Davis, the Court determined that harm created by facially neutral 
laws with a discriminatory racial impact could not be redressed by the Equal 
Protection Clause unless discriminatory intent can also be proven.212  Also, in Allen 
v. Wright, the Court decided that claims of stigmatic injuries caused by the 
government funding of discriminatory programs are not a significant enough harm to 
grant standing under Article III of the Constitution.213  Therefore, it seems 
permissible for the Court to make determinations of the appropriate amount of harm 
that third parties should suffer.  For instance, Justice Powell said that harm to third 
parties is a relevant factor, but never stated that it should never happen.  To the 
contrary, in Wygant, he explained “that in order to remedy the effects of prior 
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discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into account.  As part of this 
Nation’s dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be 
called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy.”214 
The second factor, whether there is a waiver provision, should simply be an 
absolute requirement for any affirmative action program.  This would ensure that 
affirmative action policies are not implemented in situations in which it would not be 
possible to do so.  Because I have stated that this is an absolute requirement, this 
might at first seem like I am advocating for a rigid rule much like the ones adopted 
by Justice O’Connor.  However, because this factor explicitly requires that an 
affirmative action program look at the relevant work force or applicant pool in 
determining whether a certain set-aside is possible, this requirement is actually quite 
flexible and fact specific.   
The third factor, whether the goal of the program is to achieve diversity or to 
remedy discrimination, should be weighed by giving programs that seek to remedy 
past discrimination—in particular past unconstitutional discrimination—more 
latitude than programs that aim to achieve diversity.  This distinction is based on the 
fact that remedying past discrimination is a constitutional necessity while achieving 
diversity is not.  The Fourteenth Amendment clearly prohibits invidious racial 
discrimination.215  This prohibition would be completely “toothless” unless it were 
interpreted to require that any violation of that prohibition be given a remedy.  This 
means that the Constitution mandates that the government remedy past 
discrimination.216  On the other hand, although it may encourage diversity, the 
Constitution clearly does not mandate that the government achieve diversity.  Note 
that this same reasoning would also mean that affirmative action programs designed 
to remedy past discrimination arising from a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should receive more latitude than a program designed to remedy discrimination that 
had arisen from a violation of a statute like the Civil Rights Act. 
The fourth factor, the duration of the program, should be a period long enough 
that it does not overly burden those who administer the program, yet short enough 
that it can be adjusted accordingly to changes in circumstances.  The duration could 
be shortened or lengthened based on the balance of these two factors.  For example, 
in a university admission scheme that was implementing affirmative action it 
probably would be acceptable to have the university reevaluate its program every 
year since this would coincide with the university’s yearly admission cycle. 
The fifth factor, the effectiveness of race-neutral alternatives, should require 
race-neutral alternatives only when it is clear that they are as effective as the 
affirmative action program in achieving the government’s compelling interest.  This 
would ensure that innocent third parties are not harmed unnecessarily, but would 
also make sure that the requirement for a race-neutral alternative does not nullify 
necessary affirmative action programs.  It might seem extreme at first to require 
race-neutral alternatives only when they are as effective as the affirmative action 
program; however, this is reasonable when factor one is taken into account.  If the 
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benefits of an affirmative action program are properly balanced against the harm to 
innocent third parties in factor one, then there should be no reason for a race-neutral 
alternative that might further reduce harm to innocent third parties. 
The sixth factor, which arm of the government enacted the program, should give 
more latitude to Congress and courts in designing affirmative action programs than it 
does to administrative agencies and state legislatures.  First, Congress has express 
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy the effects of past 
discrimination that state government officials do not have.217  Therefore, a reviewing 
court should apply a more lenient narrow tailoring standard to congressional 
enactments to reflect this power that Congress possesses, but that administrative 
agencies and state legislatures do not.218  Furthermore, a more lenient standard 
should be applied to courts because judges have historically been given broad and 
flexible authority to remedy wrongs, particularly wrongs resulting from 
constitutional violations.219 
The seventh factor, what type of government program is implementing the 
action, should give some types of government programs more leniency based on the 
field in which the action is being implemented.  For example, borrowing from 
Justice Kennedy’s approach in Grutter and Parents Involved, a more lenient standard 
should be applied to primary educational institutions than to graduate schools if the 
goal is to achieve diversity.  As Justice Scalia said, “cross-racial understanding” and 
“good citizenship” are lessons to be learned by “people three feet shorter and twenty 
years younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, 
in . . . public-school kindergartens.”220  This leniency can also be applied across 
different institutional contexts.  For example, the same reasoning used above that 
cross-racial understanding is a better lesson to be learned when people are 
developing may justify applying a more lenient standard to affirmative action when 
it is employed in the education context rather than in other contexts like public 
contracting or public employment. 
The final factor, whatever other factors might be relevant in a particular 
circumstance, is a catch-all.  This factor is different than the other factors which are 
general in nature, and it allows the Court to adopt a specific factor that might apply 
in only a discrete group of cases if the Court believes that factor is necessary.  
Examples of such specific factors can already be found in the Supreme Court’s 
affirmative action decisions.  One example was in Wygant, where, in the context of 
employment cases, Justice Powell decided to make it a factor that hiring plans 
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should be distinguished from lay-off plans because lay-off plans are more 
burdensome.221  Another example was in the voting rights cases, where the Court 
decided to make compliance with the Voting Rights Act a factor because the Court 
determined that compliance with the Voting Rights Act could be a compelling 
interest.222  Having a factor that can be adapted to specific circumstances will ensure 
that the narrow tailoring requirement remains flexible and loose. 
The downside to an approach like this is that lower reviewing courts have little 
initial guidance on how to weigh these factors.  It is questionable how much of an 
issue this would actually present because, as shown by the line of cases previously 
detailed in this Article, the Supreme Court does not mind keeping the lower courts 
confused on how to apply the narrow tailoring test.223  Further, district courts have 
been able to manage other fairly abstract tests presented to them by the Supreme 
Court for the Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, it is 
possible for lower courts to manage a looser standard like this. 
Another criticism of this standard might be that it would require the Supreme 
Court to take more affirmative action cases in order to clarify the standard and give 
lower courts guidance on how to balance the factors, and the Court has historically 
ducked affirmative action cases.  For example, between Adarand and Gratz, there 
were eight years during which the Court did not take a single affirmative action case 
dealing with employment, education, or public contracts, despite significant circuit 
splits.224   
One possible reason for this behavior by the Court is that affirmative action is 
such a hot-button issue that the Court would rather avoid it and hope that the issue 
passes them by, much like how the Court has ducked the Guantanamo Bay detention 
issues by deciding small issues on a case-by-case basis.225  Unfortunately, as 
represented by the Court’s full circle from Bakke to Parents Involved, the issue of 
affirmative action is far from settled and will not simply go away.  Further 
complicating the problem is that ever since Brown v. Board of Education, the 
decision that elevated the Supreme Court to its exalted status, people have looked to 
the Supreme Court, rather than the other political branches, as the final voice on 
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issues of race.226  Therefore, the Court cannot continue this policy of ducking 
affirmative action cases. 
Also, a contextualist approach to “narrow tailoring” would likely encourage the 
Supreme Court to take more affirmative action cases.  It would allow the Court to 
solve small issues on a case-by-case basis and avoid significant controversies rather 
than attempt to answer the broader and more heated question of whether affirmative 
action is good or bad by figuring out what factors need to be applied to affirmative 
action across the board.  Finally, this criticism relies on a faulty assumption that the 
Court must rule narrowly based on the facts of each case, requiring multiple rulings 
in order to clarify this standard.  While some justices on the Court, in particular 
Justice O’Connor, have frequently tried to decide cases narrowly based on the facts 
presented before them, there is nothing to stop the justices from laying out and 
detailing a more broad requirement that applies to many different factual scenarios in 
an opinion first, and then applying the broader requirement to the individual factual 
situation in that particular case.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy did something similar to 
this in Parents Involved where, in addition to stating that the government policy in 
front of him in that particular case was unconstitutional, he laid out many other 
government policies that would be constitutional.227 
A final criticism of the contextual approach might be that it gives lower judges 
too much discretion.  People might worry that such a loose multi-factored approach 
could allow a judge to decide a case however she wants by just picking and choosing 
factors that support her position.  Therefore, affirmative action would end up being a 
free-for-all in the lower courts.  However, a multi-factor contextual approach would 
actually bring greater transparency to lower court decisions because the multi-
factored approach would help make clear what the lower court judge is valuing in 
making her decisions.  This heightened transparency would help to keep lower 
judges from turning affirmative action into a free-for-all because, with greater 
transparency, these judges would be subjected to greater external political pressures 
when their reasoning deviates from higher court decisions.  In addition, this 
transparency would aid the higher courts in being able to reverse and control the 
lower courts when their decisions deviate from the Supreme Court’s opinions.  The 
Supreme Court taking more affirmative action cases on appeal or giving broader 
guidance to their decisions would also help this issue. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s narrow tailoring requirement as developed by Justice 
O’Connor is a rigid inquiry that causes inconsistent results depending on the context 
of the affirmative action case and is maladapted at achieving a proper compromise 
between the two camps of the Supreme Court.  A fact-intensive, contextualist 
approach to narrow tailoring, similar to the one adopted by Justice Powell, would be 
much more effective.  Therefore, Justice Kennedy, and anyone else who might one 
day assume the position of controlling member of the Supreme Court on affirmative 
action decisions, would benefit by adopting Justice Powell’s contextual approach to 
narrow tailoring. 
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